The Implications of Nesting in California Redistricting

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study evaluates the process of 'nesting' in redistricting on various redistricting criteria, including compactness, minimizing city and county divisions and the creation of majority minority seats. Nesting is performed in two different ways, first by adding two Assembly districts to make up one Senate district, and second by dividing Senate districts into two Assembly districts.

The results show that nested districts, no matter whether they are constructed through aggregation or division, impede the creation of majority minority districts and lead to more city and county splits than non-nested districts do. Nesting by dividing Senate Districts into Assembly seats is a slightly better method based on these criteria.

INTRODUCTION

The State of California has seen much interest in redistricting reform during the past four years. In the 2005 special election, Proposition 77, a measure that would have taken the process away from the legislature and given it to a commission, was defeated. After its defeat, activist groups interested in reform, including those that had opposed Prop. 77 for various reasons, formed a coalition to draft a better proposal, in hopes to convince the legislature to consider redistricting reform, or alternatively attempt to place a new measure on the ballot in the 2008 primary. By the spring of 2007, the legislature had revived a number of redistricting bills in both houses, and two measures were being circulated for signatures by activist groups.

At least two of the recent redistricting reform proposals include the requirement for nested districts. The term nesting refers to the incorporation of two Assembly districts within the boundaries of a single Senate district. There are two ways to nest. One can draw the smaller units first, and then combine them into the larger unit, which is how nesting has been done previously in California, or one can go the other way, drawing the Senate district first and then dividing it into two Assembly districts. This study considers the implications of both. Either way, the effect is to create a match between two Assembly districts and one Senate seat.

The fact that California has exactly half as many State Senate seats as Assembly seats (i.e. 40 and 80 respectively) makes nesting a feasible option. California has had two decades of experience with nesting after the 1973 and 1991 redistricting plans were drawn, and two decades of experience with non-nested districts in 1981 and 2001. Simply stated, when the legislature has controlled the line-drawing process, it has opted against nesting. When the courts have done the redistricting, they have nested. Which way is best?

NESTING PROS AND CONS

Pros

There are several arguments for nesting, but as in many situations in which a highly complex topic is debated, there are different ways of looking at the same coin.

First, nesting is very convenient for those who actually have to draw the lines since it reduces the total amount of line-drawing by half. By simply dividing the Senate districts or combining the Assembly seats, a line-drawer can in essence fashion the second house from the first. Given the complexity of redistricting and the amount of time it takes to construct a valid, legal plan for the State of California, this can certainly be an attractive option.

Second, nesting plausibly hampers efforts to individualize district lines for incumbent or party purposes, much as other "formal" criteria do (i.e. criteria that concern the form of a district such as compactness, contiguity, etc). Requiring nesting, in essence, is a "handcuffing" approach that assumes that the more constrained the process, the more likely the outcome will be neutral. But of course, "handcuffing" or constraining line drawers with formal requirements like nesting will also constrain the achievement of good or desirable goals along with the more controversial ones.

Third, some nesting proponents argue that it encourages more cooperation at the legislative level. Pairing Assembly legislators with Senators in common district space might in theory encourage the three grouped legislators to work together more cooperatively in order to protect or further the interests of the area they jointly represent. But it is also possible that the pairing arrangement creates incentives to compete, since both Assembly members might think that they are the logical heir to the corresponding Senate district.

Finally, there is a strictly administrative proponent view from the local registrars of voters and county clerks who are charged with the administration of elections. These local election administrators prefer nested districts because it reduces the number of ballot groups and precincts by approximately 10 to 15% in counties with over 100,000 voters that have at least one or more Senate Districts within its boundaries, and possibly more in larger counties with multiple languages. Nesting, to the registrars of the larger counties, is a time and money saving criterion. But many say that in light of the 1200 odd special districts in California, there are so many lines that criss-cross the various existing political boundaries that one more set of lines is not too much of a burden for registrars, especially since only some counties would be affected at all. Smaller counties that are completely contained within one Senate District would not be affected by nesting either way.

Cons

There are also many arguments against nesting, and again, as above, what may look like a negative to some is a positive to others.

Among the arguments against nesting are: one, that adding any additional criterion to the already long list of redistricting criteria that must be followed (including equal population, the Voting Rights Act, contiguity, respect for city and county boundaries, compactness and so on) makes the line drawing process even more constrained. In turn, this makes it more difficult to meet more subjective criteria that may be raised by certain communities. This of course also goes to the 'hand-cuffing' argument that some in the pro-nesting camp feel is necessary to curb political mischief.

Two, nesting may double a wrong in cases in which an Assembly district does not meet the need of certain groups. For example, the same Assembly lines that divide a neighborhood or split a city will be used to construct the Senate seat because nesting is required. The neighborhood or the city would thus face the same hardship in each house, lower and upper, and not have an opportunity to fight for different boundaries with the other plan.

Three, nesting is said to be harmful to party cohesion. California's political geography is such that registration majorities for the major parties are regionally aligned. For example, the coast is largely democratic while the central valley is largely republican. Consequently, nesting will in many cases produce two Assembly districts, held by members of the same party, which are nested in the same Senate District. Because California is a state with term limits, Assembly members are often looking to the Senate district as a logical step up in their political career. Nested districts, as a result, may produce two members of the same party vying for the same seat, asking for support from the same colleagues and competing for campaign contributions. Party unity can certainly be undermined in this scenario.

STUDYING NESTING

The purpose of this study is to test the effects of nesting by using a variant of the experimental design we used previously in our competitiveness report¹. In the sections of the report that follows, we will first describe the method we used to test for nesting effects. Second, we will describe our experimental results. Third, we will discuss the results of interviews with former members who held nested seats in the nineties. And finally, we will make some concluding observations about nesting practices.

¹ Competition and Redistricting in California: Lessons for Reform by Bruce E. Cain, Karin Mac Donald and Iris Hui. Data, maps and the first two reports on Competition and on Transparency are available at: http://swdb.berkeley.edu/redistricting_research/

The results can be summarized as follows. While nesting may make it more difficult for line-drawers to achieve a partisan advantage and to protect incumbents, the process also results in a more limited ability to observe county and city boundaries, and to create majority minority seats. Interviews with legislators reveal that the prospect of running for a higher seat in a nested arrangement definitely affects their thinking and dealings with the other Assembly member. Sometimes, legislators work this conflict out informally, but sometimes not.

Method

In the first redistricting report in this research series we developed an experimental design to test the potential for drawing more competitive Congressional and Assembly seats. The basic design was to generate multiple plans using different linedrawers with set objectives (e.g. purely formal boxes, maximizing the number of competitive seat, fully constrained plans, etc), and then measure the average affects across each sub-set of plans.

In this report, we essentially extended the same methodology as in our competition study to cover a new question: namely, what are the effects of drawing nested Assembly seats as compared to non-nested? Since there are two types of nesting, we divided our experiment into two halves: in the first, we first drew Assembly districts and then combined them to form Senate seats; and in the second, we first constructed whole Senate seats and then divided them to create two nested Assembly districts. For the purposes of discussion, we will call the first method "aggregation" and the second "division."

Five mappers, four of which had never drawn redistricting plans, were given the task of creating maps that followed the equal population and contiguity requirements. Mappers were instructed to draw districts as compact as possible. Only census demographic data was used in the creation of the maps, but political data was used later in the analysis. The starting point for the plans was rotated from the upper left corner to the upper right, the lower left and the lower right. First, mappers drew 'random box plans' that ignored all other criteria. These plans consisted of contiguous equal population districts. These plans are the closest scenario to using a computer program to automatically draw districts. Voting Rights Act (VRA) considerations, as well as city and county boundaries were ignored.

The mapping criteria then focused on two major redistricting principles: 1) fulfilling the VRA requirement and drawing majority-minority districts where possible and 2) preserving political subdivisions by minimizing county and city splits. Finally, 'balanced plans' were developed that took all criteria into consideration. Balanced plans come closest to what an actual and 'legal' redistricting map would look like.

For each scenario, mappers developed multiple upper and lower house plans, keeping in perspective that the resulting districts would be either nested (i.e. Assembly Districts would be aggregated to make up Senate Districts) or split (i.e. Senate Districts would be divided into two Assembly Districts). After aggregation or division of the districts, depending on the level of district on the base map, the plans were evaluated on their


effect on majority minority districts drawn, cities and counties kept in-tact, compactness and finally on how many potentially competitive districts had been created.

Again, as we point out in our first report, only what we call the "balanced plan" actually simulates what a court, legislature or other redistricting body such as a commission, would likely draw. Please note that we could not simulate 'communities of interest' as those are mainly defined during public testimony in redistricting hearings, and through submissions to the redistricting body. We also did not perform polarized voting analysis as this was outside of the scope of possibility for this project.

The purpose of the other three types of plans is to test the limit that nesting has on any particular goal. The so-called box plan allows us to see the consequences of nesting on a purely mechanical redistricting that draws square, equi-populous boxes and nothing else. The max-minority lines simulate the pure maximization of equi-populous, majority minority districts. And the minimizing city and county jurisdiction lines plans protect jurisdictional lines to the greatest extent possible. However, we must emphasize again that only the balanced plans that take into account all these factors come close to passing legal and political scrutiny.

The following maps illustrate the two nesting methods:

The maps in figures 1a and 1b illustrate nesting by the method of aggregating two Assembly Districts into Senate seats. Specifically these maps illustrate the aggregation of the (hypothetical) 22nd and 23rd Assembly Districts in figure 1a into the 14th Senate district in figure 1b.







Figure 1a:

The maps in figures 2a and 2billustrate the nesting method of dividing Senate seats into two Assembly districts. Specifically, these maps illustrate the division of the hypothetical 13th Senate District in figure 1a into Assembly Districts 13 and 13B in figure 1b.



For both methods, we constructed four plan types: compact squares, i.e. "Box plans", plans that minimize city and county boundary splits, plans that maximize majority-minority seats and plans that combine the latter two goals. All plan types observed the equal population criterion and contiguity. As a comparison, for each one of the treatments, we drew between 3 and 6 plans.

We compared the effects of nested and non-nested plans as follows. First, we computed the average number of various plan attributes for each sub-type. For example, we computed the average number of Latino seats (i.e. over 50% Latino population), the number of coalition seats (i.e. Black and Latino populations over 50%), the number of Black seats (i.e. 30% and up), the average number of county splits, the average of counties that were split more than once, etc. We then subtracted the nested numbers from the un-nested ones to get measures of relative effects.

Thus, the first entry in Table 1a (please see Appendix 1) is for the "aggregated" plans (i.e. combining two Assembly districts into a Senate seat) with formal square districts of equal population and no other constraints. The entry .67 indicates that the unnested Senate seats yielded .67 more Latino seats (i.e. with Latino populations greater than or equal to 50%) than the "aggregated" nested seats. In the aggregated plans that minimized city and county splits, the unnested seats averaged .60 more Latino seats than the aggregated nested ones. In the plans that maximized majority minority seats, the difference shoots up to 3.8 and in the fully constrained, it is 1.57. The negative entries in the table indicate where the aggregated nested seats produced more of a given feature on average than the unnested. So for example, in the square box plans, the unnested plans produced -.33 fewer Black districts (Black populations greater than 30%) than the aggregated nested plans did.

Results

Overall, the effects seem clearest for Latino seats and city/county splits. The results were mixed in most other instances. Below, we summarize by the attributes: majority minority seats created, city (i.e. census place) and county splits, and compactness. We also report the effect of nesting on potential competitiveness.

1. Majority Minority Seats

There is some evidence from our exercise that nesting, especially "aggregation," will constrain the ability to draw more majority Latino seats. This makes sense as California's Latino population is more dispersed and less clustered into compact areas than the State's African-American population. Hence, attempts to preserve Latino concentrations will run afoul of formal constraints like compactness and nesting.

In the "aggregated" nesting experiments, where we constructed two Assembly seats and combined them into Senate districts, the non-nested seats produced more majority Latino seats than the nested in all four types of plans (please see table 1a. in Appendix 1). The effects were most dramatic in the maximization of majority minority seats and the balanced plans (3.8 and 1.57 seats respectively), and less in the pure box plans (.67) and the minimize city/county splits plans (.60). The effects were also clear in the potential for combined Black and Latino majority minority seats. In all cases, the non-nested seats do better than aggregated "nested" ones. The numbers were .50 for the box plans, .60 for the plans that minimize jurisdictional splits, 1.80 for the maximize majority minority plans, and 2.07 for the balanced plans. However the effect is opposite for the number of Black influence seats: in three out of four instances the "aggregated" nested plans do better than the non-nested. However, the one instance where the nested did worse than the non-nested were the plans that balanced the criteria: i.e. in the plans most like what would actually be drawn. The differences were respectively -.33 for the box plans, -.8 for

minimize jurisdictional split plans, -.4 for the coalitional districts and .57 for the balanced plans. The negative signs indicate that the nested plans did better than the non-nested.

The results in the "division" nested experiments were more mixed, which may suggest a somewhat lower level of constraint. The nested plans actually did better for Latino and coalition districts in two out of four types of plans; (see table 2a, in Appendix 2). For Latino majority districts, the nested seats did better in plans that minimize jurisdictional splits (-.40) and those that maximize majority-minority seats (-5.33), but worse than the non-nested plans in the box (1.0) and balanced plans (1.00). For the coalitional districts, the nested plans did better in the box (-.17) and maximize coalitional seats (-4.83) scenarios, but worse than the non-nested plans in the non-nested plans in the maps that minimize jurisdictional splits (.67) and the balanced plans (1.17). In all cases, there were more Black influence seats in the non-nested than nested seats.

The balanced plans that are closest to what a legislature would actually produce, and in ALL instances, the non-nested balanced plans do better than both the aggregated and division nested plans. Given the observations of our line-drawing team and the somewhat greater inconsistency of the numbers across in the division nested scenarios, it is possible that the division method for nesting is less constraining for line drawers with respect to minority representation. The following maps illustrate the difficulty in creating nested districts when aggregating Assembly seats to create a Senate seat.




Figure 3a: Assembly District Base Map




Figure 3b: Senate districts aggregated from the Assembly district base map in figure 3a.

The maps in figures 3a and 3b (above) illustrate the potential constraint that Assembly district base maps pose on the creation of majority-minority Senate seats when nesting by aggregation. Please note the geographically isolated, individual majority-minority Assembly districts and their lack of geographic contiguity with other majority-minority Assembly seats in figure 3a. This lack of geographical contiguity between majority-minority minority Assembly seats in the base map is what constrains the creation of majority-minority minority Senate districts in this example when nesting by aggregation

This effect can be seen in the second map in figure 3b.where the lack of a neighboring majority minority Assembly district with which to aggregate another geographically isolated majority-minority Assembly district resulted in Senate districts that were also not majority minority.

2. Splits of Counties and Census Places

The next question is whether nested seats cause more or fewer splits of local jurisdictional lines. The answer for the aggregated nested seats is preponderantly that the non-nested perform better again than the nested. The figures represent the difference in the number of splits produced on average by the non-nested versus the nested. Positive numbers mean that the non-nested plans produced more splits and negative numbers means the nested plans on average produced more splits (see Table 1b in Appendix 1).




Figure 4a: Assembly District Base Map

Figure 4a above shows in green the census places in Los Angeles County that were split in an Assembly district base map. Please note that the Assembly base map in figure 4a splits 10 census places within Los Angeles County. The maps below in figures 4b and 4c illustrate two different aggregated Senate district plans that were created from the base map in figure 4a and the resulting census place splits. The beige areas represent census places that were re-united or "unsplit" during the aggregation of the Senate districts while the green areas represent census places that were still split after the aggregation of the Assembly districts to the Senate districts.




Figure 4b: Senate Districts aggregated from the Assembly District base map in figure 4a.

Please note in figure 4b that after the aggregation of the Assembly districts into Senate seats six census places were re-united, represented by the beige areas, while 4 census places remain split, as indicated by the green areas. This does not include the city of Los Angeles which must always be split because of the size of its population.




Figure 4c: An alternate Senate District plan aggregated from the Assembly District base map in figure 4a.

Please note in figure 4c. that after the aggregation of the Assembly districts into an alternate Senate plan, only five census places were re-united while 5 census places remain split. Now compare this to the maps of the un-nested Senate district plans in figures 4d and 4e.






Figure 4d. "Un-nested" Senate Districts - split of only one census place

The first example of an un-nested Senate district plan in figure 4d splits only one census place, Long Beach while the second example of an un-nested Senate district contained in figure 4e, below, splits the same census place, Long Beach, in a different location.





In the case of the pure random box plans, the non-nested plans produced more county (3.67) and census place (9.67) splits, and split more counties (1.00) and census places (8.33) split into two or more pieces; i.e. compound splits. But when we explicitly tried to reduce the number of county and census splits, the so-called "minimizing split plans," the nested plans did worse, with higher numbers of county (-4.67) and census place splits (-14.2). This pattern was also evident in the "maximize majority minority" district plans (-1.00, -16.60) and the balanced plans (-3.63, -2.17). The same pattern held for compound county and census place splits.

The "division" nesting also proved to be somewhat worse than the non-nested plans in minimizing splits, but as with the minority seats, the division method does better; (please see table 2b, in Appendix 2). The box plans yielded more nested county and census place splits (-4.67.-12.17) and more compound splits (-2.33,-7.50). Similarly, the nested had more county and census place splits (-2.50, -27.00) and compound splits (-.67, -1.33) in the maximize minority scenarios.

In the other two scenarios, the results were mixed. In the plans that minimized jurisdictional splits, the nested districts did worse (-.33) in terms of county and better in terms of census place splits (15.17). The opposite was true for the balanced plans: the nested plans did better in the county (1.75) and worse in the census place splits (-8.50). Since we give the greatest weight to the balanced plans because they are the only plans we developed that are somewhat realistic, this is further evidence that the division method is superior to aggregation nesting.

3. Potential Competitiveness

While this was not a major focus, we did evaluate the created plans under various scenarios in terms of number of potentially competitive seats in nested versus non-nested plans. Because evaluating plans for potential competitiveness was not one of the goals of this project, we only used one measure for this analysis, i.e. party registration difference within 7 points. Please refer to our report on competitiveness and redistricting for an elaboration on the different measures and data that can be, and are, used to evaluate districts for this criterion, and a discussion of factors that affect whether even a competitive district in fact produces competitive electoral contests.

Positive numbers mean the nested plans produced more competitive seats and negative numbers indicate that the non-nested did. There was no difference in the aggregated box plans between nested and non-nested, but in the other three scenarios, including the balanced plan, the nested did worse than the non-nested in the number of competitive seats (-.70, -3.80,-1.90); (see Table 1c in Appendix 1).

The division nesting method does marginally better compared to not nesting at all in producing more competitive seats when creating box plans, minimizing jurisdictional splits, and maximizing majority minority plans (-2.83, -.27, -1.00), but the nested plans did worse than the non-nested in the most important, and the only remotely legal, category of the balanced plans (1.83); (see Table 2c in Appendix 2). This might be taken as an exception to our preference for division over aggregation nesting, but it is important to note that we were not intentionally trying to draw competitive seats. This was simply a side effect of plans intended for other purposes.

4. Compactness

As with competitiveness, we did not make compactness a primary goal. There is no consensus on the best compactness measure, so we used several different ones that are commonly reported in redistricting software. Higher scores in all but the perimeter test indicate more compact districts (see Tables 1d and 1e in Appendix 1). As one might expect, the box plans received the best scores; and almost all of our plans beat the status quo districts by most measures. But is there a difference between non-nested, aggregated nested and division nested?

For the purposes of simplicity, we focused on the differences between the nested and non-nested mean scores of the balanced plans across the various compactness measures. For the aggregated nested versus non-nested comparison, four of the six measures of the difference in mean compactness for the balanced (i.e. realistic) plan slightly favor the non-nested over the nested. But for the division nested plans, four of the differences in the nested plans indicate a more compact level than the non-nested lines (see Tables 2d and 2e in Appendix 2). We take this to be yet another indication that the division method appears to be superior to the aggregated nested method.

NESTING AND MEMBER COOPERATION

There are other considerations that should be taken into account when nesting as a criterion is contemplated.

Aside from the effects that nesting has on line-drawing per se, what effects does nesting have on legislative behavior? To answer this question, we devised a questionnaire and interviewed former members of the Assembly. We asked seven questions:

- 1. Did the nesting arrangement facilitate or undermine relationship with the member of the other nested Assembly district in your Senate seat?
- 2. Did the relationship with the other nested seat change over time as the prospect of the senate seat opening became more imminent?
- 3. What are some examples of successful cooperation on legislation with the other nested seat member?
- 4. What are some examples of unsuccessful efforts at cooperation on legislation with the other nested seat member?
- 5. Did you mail into the other district? If so, when and about what?
- 6. Did you do appearances in the other districts? If so, what sort?
- 7. Do you favor making nesting a requirement for future redistricting? Why/why not?

The responses we received were from five Democrats and three Republicans. Three of them had been paired with members of the other party; and their answers reflect the fact that partisan concerns are more of an obstacle in that type of situation. In the nineties, as Appendix 3 indicates, the number of same party pairs ranged from a high of 32 in 1994 to a low of 27 in 1996, and the number of pairs from different parties ranged from 12 in 1996 to 8 in 1994. In short, the question of cooperation will likely arise mostly in the

context of same party pairings unless the landscape of California changes drastically in the future.

Another issue of note is that in the end, most members did not run against each other for the Senate seat. Usually, this matter was worked out informally, avoiding expensive battles between two lower house incumbents. Table 3 shows the three elections that pitted two former Assembly incumbents against one another in the nineties.

Year	SD	AD	Assembly Member	Party
2000	21	43	Scott Wildman	D
		44	Jack Scott	D
	23	41	Sheila James Kuehl	D
		42	Wally Knox	D
1998	10	18	Michael Sweeney	D
		20	Liz Figueroa	D
1996	7	11	Bob Campbell	D
		15	Richard K. Rainey	R

Table 3:

In all but one instance, these involved primary battles between two members of the same party. Given that the Senate is represented by former Assembly members, it is somewhat surprising that more members did not compete against each other in their party primaries. But several factors explain this. First, members are usually in different cycles of their terms, and the member who is later in the cycle has more of an incentive to run than the one who was more recently elected. Second, informal discussion and agreements often serve to persuade one member to back down when two are eyeing the same seat.

But even if two member primaries are relatively rare, it is possible that the prospect of running against the other member might cause some tensions. Hence our first questions asked whether the nesting facilitated or undermined cooperation. The responses were varied: two indicated that it undermined relationships, three that it facilitated cooperation, and three others had qualified responses. It is interesting that two of the three who thought that it facilitated cooperation were in pairings of opposite political ideologies. Since party ties usually divide these members, the fact that they had common local projects sometimes brought them together.

Several indicated that it depended upon the specific ambitions and personalities of the members. If both members were ambitious and headed for the Senate seat, this would weaken cooperation. The best situation was one in which there was a clear understanding of who would run for the Senate seat when it opened. But clearly, there are two incentives at work. Sometimes the fact that they represent the same county or parts of the

same city means that they would work together for some common goal. But it could also mean that there could be a competition for credit when there was potential electoral benefit.

We then asked whether relationships changed as the prospect of a Senate opening approached, and in all but two instances, the respondents thought that was a possibility. One former member analogized it to two people sharing a house knowing that at the end of the year, one would have to leave: "imagine how people would feel about living together...things start to happen in the middle of the night." When cooperation was achieved, it tended to be local in nature: helping a hospital become a "specialty" facility, dealing with a local firm that had mishandled the cremation of deceased constituents, building a new high school, etc. Examples of when cooperation broke down tended to center around competition for claiming exclusive or disproportionate credit on projects that both members had worked on.

It is clear that members who are thinking of running for the larger Senate seat lay the groundwork by mailing and appearing in nearby areas outside their Assembly district. But several pointed out that it was not legal to use the publicly funded mailings for this purpose, and that they only mailed with campaign funds. Visits, however, seem to be another matter. All of them made appearances in the other nested district.

On the all important question of whether they favor nesting as a policy or not, we again had a wide dispersion: three in favor, four against, and one indifferent. One of them mentioned it as a way to restrict "gerrymandering." Two thought it made the lines of accountability clearer.

Please see the summary chart in Appendix 4 for responses.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this study was to test some of the common assertions that are made about nesting districts. There are several observations that follow from the research discussed in this report. First, the strongest argument for nesting is convenience. When pressed to draw lines in a short period of time, a position the courts have found themselves in twice in California history, it is simpler to draw one set of lines and combine or divide them than to draw two separate plans. But for line drawers that have more time, the advantages of drawing one set of lines have to be offset against the constraints and limitations that nesting brings. Nesting is also marginally more convenient for Registrars of Voters and other election officials; but it results in only a ballot type reduction on the order of 10-15% since there are so many special district jurisdictions that complicate the

California ballot. This reduction, furthermore, is only realized in some counties and not all.

Second, it is quite possible that nesting will cause more city and county splits, and limit the ability to give fair representation to the Latino community in particular. This is especially true of aggregation as opposed to division nesting. This is not a surprising result in the sense that the more formal constraints that line drawers have to work with, the more likely that the various criteria will conflict with one another, and limit the ability to achieve substantive goals, including ones that relate to federal law.

Third, while there was some disagreement about the exact effects that nesting has on member cooperation, a number of the former members we interviewed indicated that there was sometimes tension between Assembly members eyeing the same Senate seat. In most cases, this seems to get resolved with informal understandings and agreements, but it seems to contribute to more intra-party tension.

Given that there might be situations when the courts or the legislature must draw lines under a tight deadline, nesting might be an option for the state's line-drawers. However, if nesting is to be used, we would recommend the division method, not aggregation. At the same time, there does not seem to be a case for requiring nesting. Our research shows that it can hinder the creation of minority districts and it leads to a greater number of local jurisdictional splits.

APPENDIX 1: Tables of differences between the non-nested Senate plan averages and the "aggregated" Senate plan averages

Plan type	Plan type						
Name	Respect county/ MM city seat boundary		No. of Latino seat (50%+)	No. of Black seat (30%+)	Potential Minority Coalition No. of Latino + Black add up to 50%+		
No treatment plans			0.67	-0.33	0.50		
Respect city & county boundaries plans	Х		0.60	-0.80	0.60		
Maximize majority- minority seats plans		Х	3.80	-0.40	1.80		
Respect CC & Max. MM plans	Х	Х	1.57	0.57	2.07		

Table 1a: Majority-Minority Seats

Table 1b: City and County Splits

Plan type			County S	plits out 58	City Splits out of 1,081		
Name	Respect county/ MM city seat boundary		No. of County Split	No. of County split in two	No. of Census places split	No. of Census places split in two	
No treatment plans			3.67	1.00	9.67	8.33	
Respect city & county boundaries plans	Х		-4.67	-1.63	-14.20	-10.60	
Maximize majority- minority seats plans		Х	-1.00	-0.20	-16.60	-22.40	
Respect CC & Max. MM plans	Х	Х	-3.63	-2.17	-0.50	0.97	

Table 1c: Competitive Seats

Plan type			2000 Party
Name	Respect county/ city boundary	MM seat	Registration No. of competitive seat (7 pt)
No treatment plans			0.00
Respect city & county boundaries plans	Х		-0.70
Maximize majority- minority seats plans		Х	-3.80
Respect CC & Max. MM plans	Х	Х	-1.90

Table 1d: Compactness Scores

Plan type	Plan type				<u>Roeck</u> : Between 0 and 1, 1 most compact					Schwartzberg: Greater or equal to 1, 1 most compact				
Name	Respect county/ city boundary	MM seat	Min	Max	Mean	St. Dev	Min	Max	Mean	St. Dev	Sum			
No treatment plans			-0.01	0.11 -0.06 0.00 0.00				329.21						
Respect city & county boundaries plans	Х		0.02	-0.01	0.00	0.00	0.18	0.48	0.10	0.09	992.57			
Maximize majority- minority seats plans		Х	-0.06	-0.05	-0.05	0.00	0.21	1.26	0.38	0.22	2,859.70			
Respect CC & Max. MM plans	Х	Х	0.04	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.06	0.01	0.05	-0.03	1,328.65			

Table 1e: Compactness Scores (continued)

Plan type		Polsby	Population Polygon: Between 0 and 1, 1 most compact							
Name	Respect county/ city boundary	MM seat	Min	Max	Mean	St. Dev	Min	Max	Mean	St. Dev
No treatment plans			0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.19	0.01	0.05	-0.04
Respect city & county boundaries plans	X		-0.03	-0.05	-0.01	0.01	0.11	0.00	0.00	0.00
Maximize majority- minority seats plans		Х	-0.06	-0.11	-0.08	-0.01	-0.08	0.01	-0.06	0.02
Respect CC & Max. MM plans	Х	Х	-0.01	-0.08	-0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.00

Table 1f: Compactness Scores (continued)

Plan type	Plan type				Population Circle: Between 0 and 1, 1 most compact				Ehrenburg: Between 0 and 1, 1 most compact			
Name	Respect county/ city boundary	MM seat	Min	Max	Mean	St. Dev	Min	Max	Mean	St. Dev		
No treatment plans			0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.05	0.06	0.02		
Respect city & county boundaries plans	Х		0.00	0.02	0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.03	0.01	0.00		
Maximize majority- minority seats plans		Х	-0.02	-0.05	-0.05	0.00	-0.01	-0.05	-0.04	0.00		
Respect CC & Max. MM plans	Х	Х	0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.04	-0.02	-0.02		

APPENDIX 2: Tables of differences between the non-nested Assembly plan averages and the "divided" Assembly plan averages

Plan ty	pe		Majo	rity-minority	seats
Name	Respect county/ city boundary	MM seat	No. of Latino seat (50%+)	No. of Black seat (30%+)	Potential Minority Coalition No. of Latino + Black add up to 50%+
No treatment plans			1.00	0.33	-0.17
Respect city & county boundaries plans	Х		-0.40	0.87	0.67
Maximize majority- minority seats plans		Х	-5.33	2.33	-4.83
Respect CC & Max. MM plans	х	Х	1.00	0.58	1.17

Table 2a: Majority-Minority Seats

Table 2b: City and County Splits

Plan ty		County Sp	lits out 58	City Splits out of 1,081		
Name	Respect county/ city boundary	county/ MM city seat		No. of County split in two	No. of Census places split	No. of Census places split in two
No treatment plans			-4.67	-2.33	-12.17	-7.50
Respect city & county boundaries plans	X		-0.33	-3.67	15.17	14.42
Maximize majority- minority seats plans		Х	-2.50	-0.67	-27.00	-1.33
Respect CC & Max. MM plans	X	Х	1.75	0.83	-8.50	-6.58

Table 2c: Competitive Seats

Plan ty	pe					
Name	Respect county/ city boundary	MM seat	2000 Party Registration No. of competitive seat (7 pt)			
No treatment plans			-2.83			
Respect city & county boundaries plans	Х		-0.27			
Maximize majority- minority seats plans		Х	-1.00			
Respect CC & Max. MM plans	Х	Х	1.83			

Table 2d: Compactness Scores

Table 24: Compactness Scores											
Plan ty		<u>Roeck</u> : Between 0 and 1, 1 most compact					<u>urtzberg</u> : Gre most c	Perimeter: Smaller total perimeter=most compact,			
Name	Respect county/ city boundary	MM seat	Min	Max	Mean	St. Dev	Min	Max	Mean	St. Dev	Sum
No treatment plans			0.16	0.26	0.20	0.01	0.08	-0.12	-0.02	-0.02	-289.59
Respect city & county boundaries plans	Х		-0.02	0.04	0.01	0.01	-0.21	-0.21	-0.06	-0.02	-902.34
Maximize majority- minority seats plans		Х	0.04	0.05	0.07	-0.01	-0.22	-3.26	-0.55	-0.40	-3,945.65
Respect CC & Max. MM plans	X	X	-0.03	0.01	0.04	0.00	0.00	-0.72	-0.24	-0.14	-2,664.11

Table 2e: Compactness Scores (continued)

Plan ty		Polsby-Popper: Between 0 and 1, 1 most compact					Population Polygon: Between 0 and 1, 1 most compact			
Name	Respect county/ city boundary	MM seat	Min	Max	Mean	St. Dev	Min	Max	Mean	St. Dev
No treatment plans			0.02	0.04	0.01	0.00	0.08	-0.02	0.01	-0.01
Respect city & county boundaries plans	X		0.02	-0.03	0.02	0.00	0.02	-0.01	0.01	-0.01
Maximize majority- minority seats plans		Х	0.10	0.16	0.11	0.00	0.03	0.01	0.11	-0.02
Respect CC & Max. MM plans	Х	Х	0.04	0.06	0.05	0.00	-0.08	-0.01	0.05	-0.01

Table 2f: Compactness Scores (continued)

Plan ty	ре		<u>Populati</u>		Between 0 and mpact	1, 1 most	Ehrenburg: Between 0 and 1, 1 most compact				
Name	Respect county/ city boundary	MM seat	Min	Max	Mean	St. Dev	Min	Max	Mean	St. Dev	
No treatment plans	o treatment plans				0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.03	0.01	
Respect city & county boundaries plans	Respect city & county X		-0.02	-0.02	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.04	0.01	0.01	
Maximize majority- minority seats plans	aximize majority-			0.05	0.07	0.00	0.07	0.05	0.08	0.00	
Respect CC & Max. MM plans	Х	Х	-0.03	-0.03	0.04	0.00	0.04	0.03	0.02	-0.01	

APPENDIX 3: Nested Seats by Party 1992-2000

Table 3a: 1992 Nested Seats by Party

	Thirty Nested Districts With Same Party Seats - 1992						Ten Nes	ted Dis	stricts V	Vith Split Party Seats - 1992	
Year	Number	SD	AD	Assembly Member	Party	Year	Number	SD	AD	Assembly Member	Party
1992	1	2	1	Dan Hauser	D	1992	1	1	3	Bernie Richter	D
1992	- 1	2	7	Valerie Brown	D	1332		<u> </u>	4	David Knowles	R
	2	3	6	Vivien Bronshvag	D		2	4	2	Stan Statham	R
	2	5	13	Willie L. Brown Jr.	D		2	-	8	Thomas M. Hannigan	D
	3	5	10	Larry Bowler	R		3	6	5	B. T. Collins	R
	5	J	17	Dean Andal	R		5	Ŭ	9	Phillip Isenberg	D
	4	8	12	John L. Burton	D		4	7	11	Bob Campbell	D
	4	0	19	Jackie Speier	D		4	<u> </u>	15	Richard K. Rainey	R
	5	9	14	Tom Bates	D		5	11	21	Byron D. Sher	D
	5	3	16	Barbara Lee	D		5		24	Chuck Quackenbush	R
	6	10	18	Jonah Klehs	D		6	14	29	Bill Jones	D
	0	10	20	Delain Eastin	D		0	17	32	Trice Harvey	R
	7	12	25	Margaret E. Snyder	D		7	18	33	Andrea Seastrand	R
	1	12	26	Sal Cannella	D		1	10	35	Jack O'Connell	D
	8	13	20	John Vasconcellos	D		8	32	61	Fred Aguilar	R
	0	13	23	Dominic L. Cortese	D		0	52	62	Joe Baca	D
	9	15	27	Sam Farr	D		9	34	68	Curt Pringle	R
	3	15	28	Rusty Areias	D		3	54	69	Tom Umberg	D
	10	16	30	Jim Costa	D		10	37	75	Jan Goldsmith	R
	10	10	31	Bruce Broznan	D		10	31	89	Julie Bernstein	D
	11	17	34	Kathleen M. Honeycutt	R				03	Julie Derristein	
		17	36	William J. Knight	R						
	12	19	37	Nao Takasugi	R						
	12	13	38	Paula L. Bowland	R						
	13	20	39	Richard Katz	D						
	15	20	40	Barbara Friedman	D						
	14	21	43	Pat Nolan	R						
	14	21	44	Bill Hodge	R						
	15	22	45	Richard G. Polanco	D						
	10	~~~	46	Louis Caldera	D						
	16	23	41	Terry B. Friedman	D						
	10	23	42	Burt Margolis	D						
	17	24	49	Diane Martinez	D						
			57	Hilda L. Solis	D						
	18	25	51	Curtis R. Tucker Jr.	D						
			52	Willard H. Murray Jr.	D						
	19	26	47	Gwen Moore	D						
	10	20	48	Marguerite Archie-Hudson	D			1			1
	20	27	54	Betty Karnette	D			t			
	20		56	Bob Elpe	D						

			1		1	1		1		1
2	21	28	53	Debra Bowen	D					
			55	Juanita M. McDonald	D					
	22	29	59	Richard Mountjoy	R					
			60	Paul V. Horcher	R					
	23	30	50	Martha M. Escutia	D					
			58	Grace Musquiz Napolitano	D					
	24	31	63	Jim Bruelte	R					
			65	Paul L. Woodruff	R					
	25	33	71	Mickey Conroy	R					
			72	Ross Johnson	R					
	26	35	67	Dorris Allen	R					
			70	Gil Ferguson	R					
	27	36	64	Ted Weggeland	R					
			66	Ray Haynes	R					
	28	38	73	Bill Morrow	R					
			74	Robert C. Franzee	R					
	29	39	76	Mike Gotch	D					
			78	Dierdre Alpert	D					
;	30	40	77	Tom Connolly	D					
			79	Steve Peace	D					

Table 3b: 1994 Nested Seats by Party

	Thirty-Two	Neste	d Distri	cts With Same Party Seats - 1994	<u> </u>		Eight Ne	sted D	istricts	With Split Party Seats - 1994	1
N	NI	00	4.5	A	Dente	N	Nerralian	0.0	4.0	A	Dente
Year 1994	Number 1	SD 1	AD 3	Assembly Member Bernie Richter	Party R	Year 1994	Number 1	SD 4	AD 2	Assembly Member Tom Woods	Party R
1994	I	1	4	David Knowles	R	1994	1	4	8	Tom Hannigan	D
	2	2	1	David Knowles Don Hauser	D		2	5	10	Larry Bowler	R
	2	2	7	Valerie K. Brown	D		2	5	17	Michael J. Machado	D
	3	3	6	Kerry Mazzoni	D		3	6	5	Barbara Alby	R
	0	Ŭ	13	Willie L. Brown Jr.	D		0	Ŭ	9	Phillip Isenberg	D
	4	8	12	John L. Burton	D		4	7	11	Bob Campbell	D
	•		19	Jackie Speier	D		•		15	Richard K. Rainey	R
	5	9	14	Tom Bates	D		5	11	21	Byron D. Sher	D
	•		16	Barbara Lee	D				24	Jim Cunneen	R
	6	10	18	Michael Sweeney	D		6	27	54	Steven T. Knykendall	R
			20	Liz Figueroa	D				56	Phil Hawkins	D
	7	12	25	Margaret E. Snyder	D		7	32	61	Fred Aguilar	R
		İ	26	Sal Cannella	D				62	Joe Baca	D
	8	13	22	John Vasconcellos	D		8	40	77	Steve Baldwin	R
			23	Dominic L. Cortese	D				79	Denise Moreno Ducheny	D
	9	14	29	Charles S. Poochigian	R					·	
			32	Trice Harvey	R						
	10	15	27	Bruce McPhearson	R						
			28	Peter Frusetta	R						
	11	16	30	Brian Setenchich	D						
			31	Cruz M. Bustamante	D						
	12	17	34	Keith Olberg	R						
			36	Will J. Knight	R						
	13	18	33	Tom J. Bordono Jr.	R						
			35	Brooks Firestone	R						
	14	19	37	Nao Takasugi	R						
			38	Paula L. Boland	R						
	15	20	39	Richard Katz	D						
			40	Barbara Friedman	D						
	16	21	43	James F. Rogan	R						
			44	Bill Hoge	R						
	17	22	45	Antonio Villaraigosa	D						
			46	Louis Caldera	D						
	18	23	41	Sheila Kuehl	D						
			42	Wally Knox	D						
	19	24	49	Diane Martinez	D						
		 	57	Martin Gallegos	D			ļ			
	20	25	51	Curtis R. Tucker Jr.	D						
			52	Willard H. Murray Jr.	D						
	21	26	47	Kevin Murray	D						
			48	Marguerite Archie-Hudson	D						
	22	28	53	Debra Bowen	D						
			55	Juanita M. McDonald	D						-
	23	29	59	Richard Mountjoy	R						

		r					
		60	Paul Horcher	R			
24	30	50	Martha M. Escutia	D			
		58	Grace F. Napolitano	D			
25	31	63	Jim Brulte	R			
		65	Brett Granlund	R			
26	33	71	Mickey Conroy	R			
		72	Ross Johnson	R			
27	34	68	Curt Pringle	R			
		69	Jim Morrissey	R			
28	35	67	Dorris Allen	R			
		70	Marilyn C. Brewer	R			
29	36	64	Ted Weggeland	R			
		66	Bruce Thompson	R			
30	37	75	Jan Goldsmith	R			
		80	Jim Battin	R			
31	38	73	Bill Morrow	R			
		74	Howard Kaloogian	R			
32	39	76	Susan A. Davis	D			
		78	Deirdre Alpert	D			

Table 3c: 1996 Nested Seats by Party

	Twenty-eight	Neste	ed Dist	<u>ricts With Same Party Seats - 19</u>	<u>96</u>		Twelve Ne	ested D	istricts	With Split Party Seats - 1996	
Year	Number	SD	AD	Assembly Member	Party	Year	Number	SD	AD	Assembly Member	Party
1996	1	1	3	Bernie Richter	R	1996	1	4	2	Tom Woods	R
1000		•	4	Thomas Oller	R	1000			8	Helen Thompson	D
	2	2	1	Virginia R. Strom-Martin	D		2	5	10	Larry Bowler	R
		-	7	Valerie K. Brown	D				17	Michael Machado	D
	3	3	6	Kerry Mazzoni	D		3	6	5	Barbara Alby	R
		-	13	Carole Midgen	D				9	Debrah Ortiz	D
	4	8	12	Kevin Shelley	D		4	7	11	Tom Torlakson	D
			19	Lou Papan	D				15	Lynne C. Leach	R
	5	9	14	Dion Louis Aroner	D		5	11	21	Ted Lampert	D
			16	Don Perata	D				24	James F. Cunneen	R
	6	10	18	Michael Sweeney	D		6	12	25	George House	R
		-	20	Liz Figueroa	D				26	Dennis A. Cardoza	D
	7	13	22	Elaine White Alquist	D		7	15	27	Fred Keeley	D
			23	Mike Honda	D				28	Peter Frusetta	R
	8	14	29	Charles S. Poochigan	R		8	16	30	Robert M. Prenter Jr.	R
			32	Roy Ashburn	R				31	Cruz M. Bustamante	D
	9	17	34	Keith Olberg	R		9	27	54	Steven Knykendall	R
			36	George Runner	R				56	Sally M. Havice	D
	10	18	33	Tom J. Bordonaro	R		10	32	61	Fred Aguilar	R
			35	Brooks Firestone	R				62	Joe Baca	D
	11	19	37	Nao Takasugi	R		11	33	71	Bill Campbell	D
			38	Tom McClintock	R				72	Dick Ackerman	R
	12	20	39	Tony Cardenas	D		12	40	77	Steve Baldwin	R
			40	Bob Hertzberg	D				79	Dennise M. Ducheny	D
	13	21	43	Scott Wildman	D					·	
			44	Jack Scott	D						
	14	22	45	Antonio Villaraigosa	D						
			46	Louis Caldera	D						
	15	23	41	Sheila James Kuehl	D						
			42	Wally Knox	D						
	16	24	49	Diane Martinez	D						
			57	Martin Gallegos	D						
	17	25	51	Edward Vincent	D						
			52	Carl Washington	D						
	18	26	47	Kevin Murray	D						
			48	Roderick White	D						
	19	28	53	Debra Bowen	D						
			55	Richard E. Floyd	D						
	20	29	59	Bob Margett	R						
			60	Gary G. Miller	R						
	21	30	50	Martha M. Escutia	D						
			58	Grace F. Napolitano	D						
	22	31	63	Bill Leonard	R						
			65	Brett J. Granlund	R						
	23	34	68	Curt Pringle	R						

		69	Jim Morrissey	R			
24	35	67	Scott Baugh	R			
		70	Marilyn C. Brewer	R			
25	36	64	Rod Pacheco	R			
		66	Bruce Thompson	R			
26	37	75	Jan Goldsmith	R			
		80	Jim Battin	R			
27	38	73	Bill Morrow	R			
		74	Howard Kaloogian	R			
28	39	76	Susan A. Davis	D			
		78	Howard Wayne	D			

Table 3d: 1998 Nested Tables by Party

	<u>Twenty-Eigh</u>	nt Nest	ed Dis	tricts With Same Party Seats- 19	<u>98</u>		<u>Twelve N</u>	ested D) istricts \	<u> With Split Party Seats - 1998</u>	
Year	Number	SD	AD	Assembly Member	Party	Year	Number	SD	AD	Assembly Member	Party
1998	1	1	3	Sam Aanestad	R	1998	1	4	2	Richard Dickerson	R
1000		· ·	4	Thomas Oller	R	1000		-	8	Helen Thompson	D
	2	2	1	Virginia R. Strom-Martin	D		2	5	10	Anthony Percetti	R
		-	7	Valerie K. Brown	D			Ŭ	17	Michael Machado	D
	3	3	6	Kerry Mazzoni	D		3	6	5	Dave Cox	R
	Ū	-	13	Carole Midgen	D		Ŭ		9	Darrel Steinberg	D
	4	8	12	Kevin Shelley	D		4	7	11	Tom Torlakson	D
			19	Lou Papan	D				15	Lynne C. Leach	R
	5	9	14	Dion Louis Aroner	D		5	11	21	Ted Lempert	D
			16	Don Perata	D				24	James F. Cunneen	R
	6	10	18	Ellen M. Corbett	D		6	12	25	George House	R
			20	John Dutra	D				26	Dennis A. Cardoza	D
	7	13	22	Elaine White Alquist	D		7	15	27	Fred Keeley	D
			23	Mike Honda	D				28	Peter Frusetta	R
	8	14	29	Mike Briggs	R		8	18	33	Abel Maldanado	R
			32	Ray Ashburn	R				35	Hannah-Beth Jackson	D
	9	16	30	Dean Florez	D		9	33	71	Bill Campbell	D
			31	Sarah Reyes	D				72	Dick Ackerman	R
	10	17	34	Keith Olberg	R		10	34	68	Ken Maddox	R
			36	George Runner	R			•.	69	Lou Carrea	D
	11	19	37	Tony Strickland	R		11	38	73	Patricia C. Bates	R
			38	Tom McClintock	R				74	Howard Kaloogian	D
	12	20	39	Tony Cardenas	D		12	40	77	Steve Baldwin	R
			40	Bob Hertzberg	D				79	Dennise M. Ducheny	D
	13	21	43	Scott Wildman	D						
			44	Jack Scott	D						-
	14	22	45	Antonio Villaraigosa	D						-
			46	Gil Cedillo	D						1
	15	23	41	Sheila James Kuehl	D						-
			42	Wally Knox	D						-
	16	24	49	Gloria Romero	D						-
			57	Martin Gallegos	D						-
	17	25	51	Edward Vincent	D						-
			52	Carl Washington	D						1
	18	26	47	Herb Wesson	D						1
			48	Roderick Wright	D						1
	19	27	54	Alan Lowenthal	D						
		<u> </u>	56	Sally M. Havice	D						1
	20	28	53	George Nakano	D						1
			55	Richard E. Floyd	D						1
	21	29	59	Bob Margett	R						
			60	Gary G. Miller	R						1
	22	30	50	Marco Antonio Firebaugh	D						
			58	Thomas M. Calderon	D						1
	23	31	63	Bill Leonard	R						1

		65	Brett J. Grandlund	R			
24	32	61	Nell Soto	D			
		62	John Longville	D			
25	35	67	Scott Baugh	R			
		70	Marilyn C. Brewer	R			
26	36	64	Rod Pacheco	R			
		66	Bruce Thompson	R			
27	37	75	Charlene Zetel	R			
		80	Jim Battin	R			
28	39	76	Susan A. Davis	D			
		78	Howard Wayne	D			

Table 3e: 2000 Nested Seats by Party

	I wenty-Eigh	it Nest	ed Dis	tricts With Same Party Seats - 20	000		<u>I welve N</u>	lested D	vistricts \	<u>Nith Split Party Seats - 2000</u>	
Year	Number	SD	AD	Assembly Member	Party	Year	Number	SD	AD	Assembly Member	Party
2000	1	1	3	Sam Aanestad	R	2000	1	4	2	Richard Dickerson	R
2000		•	4	Tim Leslie	R	2000			8	Helen Thompson	D
	2	2	1	Virginia R. Strom-Martin	D		2	5	10	Anthony Percetti	R
		-	7	Patricia Wiggins	D				17	Barbara Matthews	D
	3	3	6	Joe Nation	D		3	6	5	Dave Cox	R
	Ŭ		13	Carole Midgen	D		Ŭ	•	9	Darrel Steinberg	D
	4	8	12	Kevin Shelley	D		4	7	11	Joe Canciamilla	D
			19	Lou Papan	D				15	Lynne C. Leach	R
	5	9	14	Dion Luis Aroner	D		5	12	25	Dave Cogdill	R
	Ŭ		16	Wilma Chan	D		Ŭ		26	Dennis A. Cordoza	D
	6	10	18	Ellen M. Corbett	D		6	15	27	Fred Keeley	D
	Ŭ		20	John Dutra	D		Ŭ		28	Simon Salinas	R
	7	11	21	Joe Simitian	D		7	17	34	Robert Conaway	D
			24	Rebecca Cohn	D				36	George Runner	R
	8	13	22	Elaine White Alguist	D		8	18	33	Abel Maldanado	R
	Ŭ		23	Manny Diaz	D		Ŭ		35	Hannah-Beth Jackson	D
	9	14	29	Mike Briggs	R		9	33	71	Bill Campbell	D
			32	Roy Ashburn	R				72	Lynn Daucher	R
	10	16	30	Dean Florez	D		10	34	68	Ken Maddox	R
			31	Sarah Reyes	D			•.	69	Lou Correa	D
	11	19	37	Tony Strickland	R		11	38	73	Patricia C. Bates	R
			38	Keith Stuart Richman	R				74	Mark Wyland	D
	12	20	39	Tony Cardenas	D		12	40	77	Jay La Suer	R
			40	Bob Hertzberg	D				79	Juan Vargas	D
	13	21	43	Dario J. Frommer	D					e som e si gut	
			44	Carol Liu	D						
	14	22	45	Jackie Goldberg	D						1
			46	Gil Cedillo	D						
	15	23	41	Fran Pavely	D						1
			42	Paul Koretz	D						1
	16	24	49	Gloria Romero	D						
			57	Edward Chavez	D						
	17	25	51	Jerome F. Horton	D						
			52	Carl Washington	D						
	18	26	47	Herb Wesson	D						
			48	Roderick Wright	D	1					1
	19	27	54	Alan Lowenthal	D						
			56	Sally M. Havice	D	1					1
	20	28	53	George Nakano	D	1					1
			55	Jenny Oropeza	D	1			1		1
	21	29	59	Dennis Mountjoy	R	1					1
			60	Gary G. Miller	R						1
	22	30	50	Marco Antonio Firebaugh	D						1
			58	Thomas M. Calderon	D						1
	23	31	63	Bill Leonard	R						1

		65	Jan Leja	R				
24	32	61	Gloria Negrete McLeod	D				
		62	John Longville	D				
25	35	67	Tom Harman	R				
		70	John Campbell	R				
26	36	64	Rod Pacheco	R				
		66	Dennis Hollingsworth	R				
27	37	75	Charlene Zettel	R				
		80	Dave Kelley	R				
28	39	76	Christine Kehoe	D				
		78	Howard Wayne	D				

	Respondent A	Respondent B	Respondent C	Respondent D	Respondent E	Respondent F	Respondent G	Respondent H
Question 1: Did the nesting arrangement facilitate or undermine the relationship with the member of the other nested Assembly district in your Senate seat?	Depends on the other member	Undermined	Facilitated	Facilitated	Undermined	Facilitated	Both	Neither
Question 2: Did the relationship with the other nested seat change over time as the prospect of the senate seat opening became more imminent?	No [Never wanted to be a Senator]	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Question 3: What are some examples of successful cooperation on legislation with the other nested seat member?	Senate Bill X, environmental projects, infrastructure	[N/A]	Washington Hospital issue	Building a high school	After agreement not run for same seat, both supported each other's efforts	Cremation company issue	District business, working with interest groups	Bond money, parks
Question 4: What are some examples of unsuccessful efforts at cooperation on legislation with the other nested seat member?	Drawing lines, immigration	[N/A]	Budget deficit, partner was greedy	All had to do with party	unsuccessful effort = they ran against each other	Any time the other member would grandstand on an issue	District business, working with interest groups	[N/A]
5. Did you mail into the other district? If so, when and about what?	Yes, about non- partisan issues	No	Yes, respondent was helping represent them	No	Yes, campaign mail during active campaign	No	Yes, interest groups	No, not allowed to
Question 6: Did you do appearances in the other districts? If so, what sort?	Yes, educational /environmental issues	Yes, ceremonial and personal	Yes, where respondent knew people	Yes, when invited	Yes, because it's normal	Yes, for party purposes	Yes, when invited	Yes, state education budget
Question 7: Do you favor making nesting a requirement for future redistricting? Why/why not?	Not for or against it, there are too many micro variables	No, there is too much bias	No, no need	Yes, it provides clarity and integrity for the constituents	No, redist. not as equitable as it could be	Yes, the lines are clear and you know who your rep. is	Yes, because you'll know who your rep. is	No, not as number one requirement.